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Abstract Understanding how the brain integrates features
from diVerent domains that are processed in distinct
cortical regions calls for the examination of integration
processes. Recent studies of feature-repetition eVects
demonstrated interactions across perceptual features and
action-related features: repeating only some features of the
perception–action episode hinders performance. These par-
tial-repetition costs point to the existence of temporary
memory traces (event Wles). However, the principles and
the constraints that govern the management of such traces
are still unclear. Here, we investigated whether children
with autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) diVer from typically
developing children in managing episodic memory traces.
The results show that both groups integrate stimulus fea-
tures along with action features, but children with ASD
exhibit larger partial-repetition costs, suggesting lesser con-
trol and Xexibility in updating episodic memory traces. The
Wndings are discussed in the light of evidence for a central
role of the dopaminergic system in cognitive integration,
ASD, and cognitive control.
Introduction
Given that the primate cortex processes the various features
of perceptual events and actions in distinct brain regions
(e.g., DeYoe & van Essen, 1988), it has been assumed that
the representations of these features need to be integrated
into coherent episodic bindings (e.g., Hommel, 2004;
Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992). Evidence for the
spontaneous integration of perceptual features comes from
analyses of (interactions between) repetition eVects. For
instance, people not only respond faster to letters that they
just saw in a preview display (a standard priming or repeti-
tion eVect), but they are particularly fast if the repeated let-
ter also appears in the same location (Kahneman et al.,
1992). This suggests that processing a perceptual event
induces the binding of the codes of its features, so that
repeating the particular conjunction of features allows for
particularly eYcient processing.
Comparable observations have been made for auditory
features (Mondor, Hurlburt, & Thorne, 2003; Zmigrod &
Hommel, 2009), perceptual features from diVerent sensory
modalities (Zmigrod, Spapé, & Hommel, 2009), and for
perceptual and action features (Hommel, 1998). For
instance, responding to object A by carrying out response X
is easier after having paired A and X, or the unrelated
object B and action Y, than after having responded diVer-
ently to the same object (A ! Y) or responded similarly to
a diVerent object (B!X). Apparently, then, a single pairing
of a stimulus (feature) and a response is suYcient to create
an episodic binding (an event Wle; Hommel, 1998) that
interferes with partially, but not completely overlapping
bindings. This suggests that repeating at least one (stimulus
and/or response) feature leads to the retrieval of the just
created binding, which interferes with current processing if
that involves the reactivation of a previous (no longer valid)
feature code (Hommel, 2004). This produces costs which
we refer to as partial-repetition costs (i.e., the performance
deWcits with incomplete repetitions of stimulus-feature or
stimulus–response combinations as compared to complete
repetitions or alternations).
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are met: feature codes need to be integrated in the respective
prime trial (a process reXecting binding eYciency); and this
created binding needs to be retrieved in the present (probe)
trial (a process reXecting the eYciency to control episodic
bindings). Interestingly, attempts to dissociate these two pro-
cesses provided evidence that the binding process proper is
more or less automatic (Hommel, 2005). For instance, the
degree and strength of binding two given features is indepen-
dent from the frequency and probability of their co-occur-
rence (Colzato, RaVone, & Hommel, 2006; Hommel &
Colzato, 2009) and the availability of attentional resources
(Hommel, 2005; Takegata et al., 2005). Nevertheless, bind-
ings involving task-relevant features have a stronger impact
on behavior (Hommel, 1998, 2007) and can persist longer
(Zmigrod & Hommel, 2010). Presumably, they are more
likely to be retrieved (and/or created) as well as decay slower
than irrelevant features. Furthermore, the retrieval process
seems to be aVected by task instructions and individual
diVerences. For instance, partial-repetition costs have been
found to be more pronounced in populations that are unlikely
to possess particularly well-functioning binding processes,
such as individuals with low Xuid intelligence (Colzato, van
Wouwe, Lavender, & Hommel, 2006) and in young children
and elderly participants (Hommel, Kray, & Lindenberger,
2011). This suggests at least some degree of control, assum-
ingly during episodic retrieval. Thus, Given that executive-
control functions are related to Xuid intelligence (Duncan
et al., 2000), not fully developed in young age (Hon-
gwanishkul, Happaney, Lee, & Zelazo, 2005), and impaired
in old age (Fisk & Sharp, 2004), these observations suggest
that people diVer with respect to the eYciency of managing
episodic representations. More speciWcally, it makes sense to
assume that individuals with more eYcient executive-control
functions like people high in Xuid intelligence and younger
adults are better able to either inhibit no longer relevant bind-
ings or update those bindings to represent current feature
combinations (Colzato, RaVone, et al., 2006).
The possibility that individual diVerences relate mainly
to control over memory traces is also consistent with recent
Wndings of Keizer, Verment, and Hommel (2010), whose
participants received neurofeedback to increase cortical
gamma synchronization. Such training improved memory
retrieval of relevant information in a standard recollection
task and reduced partial-repetition costs due to irrelevant
bindings. Convergent evidence comes from a study of
Hommel, Fischer, Colzato, van den Wildenberg, and Cel-
lini (2011, in press). Consistent with Kofman, Meiran,
Greenberg, Balas, and Cohen (2006), Hommel et al.
observed that inducing mild stress improved task-switching
performance—an indicator of executive-control function-
ing. Interestingly, the same manipulation also reduced par-
tial repetition costs, suggesting more eVective control of
episodic retrieval. Thus, although the relationship between
binding of stimulus and response features (as in the event-
Wle task) and control processes is not entirely clear, studies
using this task demonstrated that the partial-repetition costs
are aVected in populations that are impaired with respect to
cognitive control or in various situations that associated
with lack of cognitive control (Colzato, van Wouwe, et al.,
2006; Colzato, Kool, & Hommel, 2008; Hommel et al.,
2011; 2011, in press). Given that performing the event-Wle
task does require, or beneWt from, the retrieval of previous
episodes, eYcient control would result in the prevention of
retrieval in the Wrst place or, if that is not possible, in the
inhibition of retrieved bindings.
In view of these hints to a link between executive control
functions and the management of episodic event Wles, we
considered binding-task performance in individuals suVering
from autistic spectrum disorder (ASD)—a disorder that has
been related to deWcits in both episodic binding (Frith, 2003)
and cognitive control (Solomon et al., 2009)—particularly
interesting. ASD is one of the most common childhood disor-
ders and characterized by social communication impairment,
deWcits in language skills, and repetitive behaviors. Various
authors have advocated various factors that might account for
the disorder, but it is fair to say that there is a rather general
agreement that impairments related to executive control
functions play a major role (Corbett, Constantine, Hendren,
Rocke, & OzonoV, 2009; Hill, 2004; Kenworthy, Black, Har-
rison, Della Rosa, & Wallace, 2009). Among other things,
these impairments are assumed to render ASD patients cog-
nitively less Xexible, which would account for both impaired
performance in clinical tests like the Wisconsin card sorting
task (WCST: Willcutt, Sonuga-Barke, Nigg, & Sergeant,
2008) and behavioral rigidity in everyday life behavior.
Unfortunately, however, experimental evidence support-
ing the link between ASD and cognitive Xexibility is still
scarce and equivocal (Geurts, Corbett, & Solomon, 2009;
Poljac et al., 2010). As suggested by Geurts et al., this might
be due to the fact that most clinical tests are rather complex
and unlikely to provide process-pure measures of the cogni-
tive processes of interest. For instance, the WCST relies on a
good understanding of the task, working memory, learning
from feedback, the availability of multiple strategies, and so
on. Not all of these abilities and skills are related to the pro-
cesses targeted by executive-control and Xexibility accounts
of ASD, so that the outcomes on these kinds of tests are
open to various interpretations. Clearly, there is a need for
more diagnostic experimental tasks that provide more pro-
cess-pure measures of cognitive control and Xexibility.
In the present study, we investigated whether ASD is
associated with impairments in managing episodic event
Wles. More speciWcally, we were interested to see whether
ASD patients are impaired in controlling and Xexibly
switching between stimulus–response bindings. This would123
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suVering from ASD in tasks requiring cognitive Xexibility,
such as Intradimensional/Extradimensional (ID/ED) shift
task of the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated
Battery (CANTAB) (OzonoV et al., 2004), or the WCST
(for a review, see Hill, 2004). If ASD patients have a deWcit
in integrating stimulus and/or response features—as some
authors have claimed (e.g., Frith, 2003), one would expect
ASD patients to show small or no partial-repetition costs.
However, if ASD would indeed be associated with poorer
event-Wle management abilities, one would expect ASD
patients to show more pronounced partial-repetition costs
than control participants do. We tested our hypothesis by
comparing the performance of a group of ASD-diagnosed
children and a group of normally developing children in a
standard event-Wle task (e.g., Hommel, 1998), which was
only slightly adapted for use with children.
Method
Participants
The participants in this study included 40 children of age
between 11 and 18 years : 20 children (13 males) with
autism spectrum disorder (ASD) (age 11–18, mean 15, SD
2.02), and 20 (14 males) typically developing children (the
control group; age 11–18, mean 15, SD 2.01).
The children with ASD were selected from consecutive
referrals to the outpatient and inpatient Department of
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry at the University Medical
Centre of Utrecht, the Netherlands. In order to qualify for
the current study, the ASD participants had to meet the fol-
lowing three criteria: First, a diagnosis of ASD was
required. Two certiWed experienced child psychiatrists
diagnosed these participants and needed to reach a consen-
sus on diagnosis. They used DSM-IV criteria for autistic
disorder (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
order, Fourth Edition; American Psychiatric Association,
1994) to evaluate the developmental history of the child as
well as current social, emotional, and adaptive functioning.
Furthermore, medical records and structured questionnaires
completed by the child’s parents and teacher(s) were
included in the diagnostic process (Child Behavior Check-
list: CBCL; and Teacher’s Report Form: TRF; Achenbach
& Edelbrock, 1986). Both child psychiatrists observed and
interviewed the child in a semi-structured playroom session
according to a DSM checklist made available for the Dutch
situation. Second, Full-Scale IQs (FSIQ) were required to
be 70 or above (Mean IQ 101; SD 9.71), as measured with
the Dutch adaptation of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
Children (Wechsler, 1997). Third, all participants were to
have normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
In the healthy controls we included children with the
same age range and IQ (there was no signiWcant diVerence
IQ between the groups as measured by t-test, t(38) = 2.011;
p = .051), but without any known neurological or develop-
mental disorders. Their IQ was above 70 (Mean IQ 107; SD
8.81) as measured by the Dutch adaptation of the Wechsler
Intelligence Scale for Children (Wechsler, 1997), with nor-
mal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Finally, the study was conducted in accordance with the
declaration of Helsinki and guidelines of the local ethics
committee. All parents signed a written consent before par-
ticipating in the study.
Procedure and design
The event Wle task measures binding-related eVects, which
can be quantiWed by calculating partial-repetition costs
related to combinations of stimulus features (shape and
color in our case) and combinations of stimulus features
and the response.1 One of the perceptual features was
task-relevant feature (shape) and the other (color) was the
irrelevant feature for the task. To manipulate the repetition
versus alternation of stimulus features and responses, the
task comprises of pairs of trials with a prime trial (S1 ! R1)
followed by a probe trial (S2 ! R2), see Fig. 1. The probe
trial required a manual binary-choice response (R2) to the
shape of the second stimulus S2 (an apple or a banana). The
prime trial required a manual response (R1) to the mere
onset of the Wrst stimulus (S1). The correct R1 was signaled
in advance of S1 (through a left- or right-pointing arrow-
head), so that S1 and R1 could be varied independently,
which was necessary to create orthogonal repetitions and
alternations of stimulus shape and response. As an addi-
tional stimulus feature, color was also varied by presenting
the apple or banana in green or yellow (see Colzato, van
Wouwe, et al., 2006). Stimulus color could repeat or alter-
nate independently of stimulus shape and responses, thus
creating a 2 £ 2 £ 2-factorial design.
Each trial consisted of a prime-probe pair. The experi-
ment was composed of a practice block with ten practice
1 Partial-repetition costs for a given interaction between factors X and
Y were calculated as the diVerence between the RTs/PEs for partial
repetitions (feature X repeated and feature Y alternated, or vice versa)
and the RTs/PEs for complete repetitions and “complete” alternations.
E.g., the partial repetition costs in RTs for the shape X response inter-
action at a given group would be PRCshapeXresponse = (RT shape
repeated/response alternated + RT shape alternated/response repeat-
ed)/2 ¡ (RT shape repeated/response repeated + RT shape alternated/
response alternated)/2. Partial repetition costs thus correspond to the
2-way interaction term of the respective features (and are thus immune
to possible, but theoretically less relevant, main eVects of feature rep-
etition); a value close to zero means that the repetition eVects of the two
given features do not interact; a value greater than zero indicates a
“binding-type” interaction of the sort described in the text.123
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tal block with 196 experimental trials. The order of the tri-
als was randomized but all eight conditions appeared
equally often. Half of the participants responded to the
apple and the banana by pressing on the left and right key
press, respectively, while the other half received the oppo-
site mapping. The participants were asked to respond as
quickly and accurately as possible.
Results
Trials with incorrect R1 responses (0.75%), as well as miss-
ing (RT > 1,500 ms) or anticipatory (RT < 100 ms) R2
responses (0.02%) were excluded from analysis. From the
remaining data, mean reaction time (RTs) and percentage
of errors (PEs) for R2 (see Table 1) were analyzed as a
function of the four variables: the relationship between S1
and S2 (repetition vs. alternation) with regard to shape and
to color, and the relationship between responses R1 and R2
(repetition vs. alternation), which all varied within partici-
pants, and group (ASD vs. control). Mixed-design ANO-
VAs were performed with repeated measures on three
variables and with group as between-participant variable.
ASD patients tended to be faster than control partici-
pants (RTs: 576 vs. 611 ms), F(1,38) = .852, p = .362, but
were less accurate (PEs: 9.57 vs. 4.3%), F(1,38) = 14.42,
p < .001, suggesting a somewhat diVerent speed-accuracy
Fig. 1 Sequence of events in 
the event Wle task. A visual re-
sponse cue signaled a left or 
right response (R1) that was to 
be delayed until presentation of 
the Wrst stimulus S1 (S1 is used 
as a detection signal for R1). The 
second stimulus S2 appeared 
1,000 ms after S1. S2 signaled 
R2, a speeded left or right re-
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Table 1 Means of mean reaction times for responses to stimulus 2
(RTR2 in ms) and SE in parenthesis, as a function of group (ASD chil-
dren vs. control—typically developing children), the relationship be-
tween the responses (R1 and R2), and the relationship between the
stimuli features (S1 and S2) for shape and color
The rightmost column gives the partial repetition costs (see footnote 1), which diVered signiWcantly in response-shape between the two groups,
p < .005, both in reaction times and error rates
Group Response repeated Response alternated Partial repetition 
costs
Shape repeated Shape alternated Shape repeated Shape alternated
RTs (ms)
ASD 518 (20) 649 (24) 591 (24) 549 (24) 86
Control 576 (20) 635 (24) 616 (24) 568 (24) 53
Errors (%)
ASD 5.7 (0.8) 18.1 (1.9) 14.5 (1.6) 4.5 (0.8) 11.2
Control 1.3 (0.8) 6.1 (1.9) 9.6 (1.6) 1.6 (0.8) 6.4
Group Response repeated Response alternated Partial repetition 
costs
Color repeated Color alternated Color repeated Color alternated
RTs (ms)
ASD 580 (22) 587 (21) 575 (24) 566 (23) 8
Control 600 (22) 611 (21) 592 (24) 592 (23) 5
Errors (%)
ASD 11.4 (1.3) 12.4 (1.4) 10.2 (1.2) 8.7 (1.2) 1.2
Control 3.6 (1.3) 3.8 (1.4) 7.3 (1.2) 4.0 (1.2) 1.8123
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tion in RTs, F(1,38) = 13.54, p < .001, due to faster
responses to repeated (581 ms) than alternated shapes
(605 ms). This eVect was modiWed by group, F(1,38) =
5.20, p < .05; separate ANOVAs, split by group, revealed
that it was statistically signiWcant only in the ASD group,
F(1,19) = 13.207, p < .005, where responses were slower
to shape alternation (596 ms) than to shape repetition
(556 ms), indicating slower adaptation to alternations.
These results are in line with studies showing that ASD
children demonstrate deWcits in adaptive skills (e.g., Kanne
et al., 2011; Paul et al., 2004) and repetitive behaviors
(South, OzonoV, & Mcmahon, 2007).
There were signiWcant interactions between shape repeti-
tion and response repetition in RTs, F(1,38) = 113.77,
p < .0001; and PEs, F(1,38) = 61.08, p < .0001. These Wnd-
ings followed the common pattern with worse performance
if only one of the features (shape or response) is repeated
while the other is not, as compared with complete repeti-
tions or alternations (see Hommel, 1998). In addition, there
was a signiWcant interaction between color, the irrelevant
feature, and the response in PEs, F(1,38) = 9.87, p < .005,
showing that the response was more accurate for total repe-
tition or total alternation of the response and the color than
partial repetition (see Table 1).
More importantly for our study, the response–shape inter-
action was further modiWed by group in both RTs,
F(1,38) = 4.478, p < .05; and PEs, F(1,38) = 6.82, p < .05
(see Fig. 2). This was due to more pronounced interactions
in children with ASD than in typically developing children.
In contrast, group was not involved in either the three-way
interactions with shape and color or with color and response,
all Fs(1,38) < 1, or the four-way interaction, F(1,38) = 0.51,
p = .48, and F(1,38) = 2.65, p = .11, for RTs and PEs,
respectively, indicating that the impact of group is restricted
to eVects of features from relevant dimensions.
To further analyze the response–shape interaction, we
calculated partial repetition costs (see footnote 1) for RTs
and PEs and ran an ANOVA with group type. There were
reliable eVects of group in RTs: F(1,38) = 4.47 p < .05, and
PEs: F(1,38) = 6.83, p < .05, indicating higher costs associ-
ated with shape–response integration for ASD than the con-
trol group (see Fig. 3).
As the experiment was relatively long, participants could
develop particular strategies to deal with the task, espe-
cially with its relevant aspects (i.e., shape and response fea-
tures) which might have changed the respective eVects over
time. To test this possibility and to see whether it might
have emerged in the two groups diVerently, we split the
data into a Wrst and second half, calculated (response-
shape) partial repetition costs for the two practice levels for
each group in RTs and PEs, and ran an ANOVA with prac-
tice level and group type as factors. However, there were no
signiWcant main eVects of practice level in RTs and PEs
(Fs < 1) or interactions between group and practice level
(Fs < 1). This does not provide evidence that all or some of
the participants developed particular strategies to deal with
the task over time, at least not in a systematic fashion.
Fig. 2 Mean reaction times and error percentages (on R2) for repeti-
tion versus alternation of the shape as a function of response repetition
versus alternation and the group
Fig. 3 EVects indicating shape-response partial repetition costs (foot-
note 1) in reaction times and error rates (on R2), for the ASD and con-
trol groups. *p < .005123
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The aim of this study was to investigate whether children
suVering from ASD would show a speciWc deWcit in a task
tapping into the handling of episodic event Wles, that is, of
bindings between codes that represent the features of expe-
rienced objects and stimulus–response episodes (Hommel,
1998, 2004). Both normally developing controls and the
ASD group showed partial-repetition costs for combina-
tions of the two task-relevant stimulus and response fea-
tures: stimulus shape and response location. It is known
that task relevance modulates feature-integration eVects
(e.g., Hommel, 1998; Hommel & Colzato, 2004) so that it
is not surprising that the reliable eVects were mainly
restricted to the features that mattered for the task. More
interesting, however, is that these eVects were observed in
both groups. Given that partial-repetition costs in S2–R2
performance can only occur if the respective features are
integrated when processing S1 and R1, this observation
implies that binding as such does not seem to be impaired
in ASD. This does not seem to Wt with the claim that ASD
is associated with diYculties in feature integration (e.g.,
Frith, 2003).
Importantly, the aftereVects of binding were larger but
not smaller in the ASD group (see Fig. 3), suggesting that
ASD children are impaired in managing of episodic repre-
sentations. That is, both healthy controls and children
suVering from ASD seem to spontaneously integrate stimu-
lus–response episodes and automatically retrieve traces of
these episodes when facing a similar, that is, feature-over-
lapping episode thereafter (see Fig. 2). However, healthy
controls seem to be more eYcient in preventing these traces
from aVecting ongoing processes and/or updating the traces
if they do not Wt with the current feature combinations,
reXecting a speciWc deWcit in cognitive control in ASD. We
found no evidence that the after-eVects of binding the rele-
vant task features change over time or that such changes
diVered between the two groups, suggesting that the group
diVerences are relatively stable. These Wndings are in line
with the recent observations that partial-repetition costs are
more pronounced in individuals with low Xuid intelligence
(Colzato, van Wouwe, et al., 2006) and in young children
and elderly participants, as compared with young adults
(Hommel et al., 2011). Taken together, these Wndings sug-
gest that less eYcient control functions increase the impact
of previously created feature bindings.
Studies have demonstrated ASD-related impairments in
various executive functions (Hill, 2004; OzonoV et al.,
2004; Solomon, OzonoV, Cummings, & Carter, 2008). Spe-
ciWcally, deWcits in cognitive control and Xexibility have
long been associated with ASD (Geurts et al., 2009).
Numerous studies have shown such deWcits in various neu-
ropsychological tests, such as the WCST task (Hill, 2004),
the ID/ED shift task (OzonoV et al., 2004), and the prepar-
ing to overcome prepotency (“POP”) task (Solomon et al.,
2008, 2009). The present study provides additional evi-
dence for ASD-related impairments in cognitive control
and Xexibility and points to a speciWc deWcit with regard to
the Xexible adjustment of perception–action episodes.
Hence, there are reasons to assume that partial-repetition
costs provide additional measurement of Xexibility, at least
with respect to the updating of cognitive representations.
Converging evidence for an interesting theoretical and
empirical link between ASD, control functions, and partial-
repetition costs comes from research on the neuromodula-
tion of the underlying cognitive processes and in particular
from the fact that they all seem to rely on prefrontal dopa-
minergic pathways and their interaction with striatal dopa-
minergic pathways. Atypical dopaminergic activity is
associated with ASD along with ADHD and schizophrenia
(Previc, 1999, 2007). Considering the comorbidity between
ASD and ADHD, it seems plausible that a dopamine-
related abnormality is the common source for the similar
symptoms in these two disorders (Gillberg & Billstedt,
2000). In addition, some of the behavioral symptoms in
ASD children were reduced by administrating risperidone
(a dopamine-receptor antagonist; McCracken et al., 2002).
Moreover, ASD is considered as one of the most highly
heritable developmental disorder, and a number of genes
linked to it (see: Yonan et al., 2003) are associated with
dopamine, such as DBH (Robinson, Schutz, Macciardi,
White, & Holden, 2001).
The dopaminergic system is also involved in a number
of executive control functions, such as planning, working
memory, or temporal sequencing (for a review, see Previc,
1999). More relevant to our study, there is compelling evi-
dence that the dopaminergic system is important for mental
Xexibility and cognitive shifting operations. For instance,
older adults show declines in dopaminergic transmission
related to D1 (Rinne, Lonnberg, & Marjamaki, 1990;
Suhara et al. 1991) and D2 receptors (Rinne et al., 1990;
Volkow et al., 1996), and these declines are associated with
poor performance in many neuropsychological control-
related tests, such as the Stroop task, the WCST, and others
(Volkow et al., 1998). This decline in cognitive ability can
be corrected by administrating dopaminergic agonist such
as Piribedil (Ollat, 1992). Furthermore, Xexibility is
improved by inducing positive aVect (Dreisbach, 2006; van
Wouwe, Band, & Ridderinkhof, 2011), which is assumed to
induce temporary increases of the dopamine level (Ashby,
Isen, & Turken, 1999; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). Thus,
cognitive control and Xexibility in particular appear to be
modulated by dopamine.
Given that both ASD and cognitive Xexibility seem to
depend on dopaminergic pathways, it is interesting that the
same seems to be true for partial-repetition costs. For123
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(Colzato, Wouwe, & Hommel, 2007a) and related to indi-
vidual diVerences in the spontaneous eyeblink rate (Colz-
ato, Wouwe, & Hommel 2007b), a clinical marker for the
level of dopaminergic functioning (Blin, Masson, Azulay,
Fondarai, & Serratrice, 1990; Kleven & Koek, 1996).
Moreover, aftereVects of stimulus–response bindings are
aVected by stress (Colzato et al., 2008) and the use of can-
nabis, but not cocaine (Colzato & Hommel, 2008), suggest-
ing that it is mainly dopaminergic D1 receptors that are
involved, but not D2 receptors. Given that D1, but not D2,
receptors are dominant in the mesocortical dopaminergic
pathways, which are also assumed to drive executive con-
trol functions including working memory (e.g., Arnsten &
Goldman-Rakic, 1998), these observations provide con-
verging evidence for a link between ASD, executive con-
trol, and the management of episodic feature bindings.
To conclude, meeting the challenges a dynamic environ-
ment poses requires the human brain to Wnd a balance
between stability—as in integrating and keeping integrated
the features of perceived event along with the actions they
aVord—and Xexibility—as in updating, managing, and
adapting integrated representations. Distortions of this bal-
ance can cause inXexibility and maladaptive behavior as
can be seen in developmental disorders (Previc, 2007), sub-
stance abuse (Colzato & Hommel, 2008; Previc, 2007), and
stress-related behaviors (Arnsten & Goldman-Rakic, 1998;
Colzato et al., 2008). The present study provides evidence
that ASD is associated with a speciWc deWcit in updating
episodic stimulus–response representations. From a general
neuroscientiWc perspective, this implies that ASD is target-
ing processes and functions that are crucial not so much for
the creation of episodic bindings but for their cognitive
control and updating. Accordingly, ASD can serve as a use-
ful “model” for the breakdown of the control of retrieval
from episodic memory. From a neuropathological perspec-
tive, it is interesting that even the relatively simple task we
used to assess aftereVects of feature binding captures the
essence of processes that also impair performance in more
complex experimental tasks and neuropsychological tests.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Crea-
tive Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which permits any
noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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